Dust settling in Iran

I'm seeing a little bit more clarity about who the players are here. In essence, this is a succession struggle. Supreme Leader Khamenei is nearly 70, and may have health problems. In 2007, he disappeared from public view for some weeks, probably for some sort of medical treatment. He seems to be in relatively good health at the moment, but he is certainly at an age when he must consider who will rule after he dies.

Khamenei would like his second son, Mojtaba Khamenei, to succeed him. Mojtaba does not have a strong public political profile. Most reports say that he is not known as a particularly sharp Islamic jurist, and he does not hold the rank of ayatollah. What Mojtaba does have: the full support of his father, and a high position in the Revolutionary Guards.

The Revolutionary Guards are an arm of Iran's military, separate from the regular army. The Guards played a large role in the Iran-Iraq war, but today are responsible mainly for internal security -- in other words, suppressing dissent. The Guards are also the nominal superiors of the Basij militia which has been used to violently subdue the recent protests.

Over the past 5 years, under Ahmadinejad's presidency, the Revolutionary Guards have gained increasing control over the economy and the country as a whole. Under former President Khatami, 3 of 21 cabinet posts were held by men with ties to the Revolutionary Guard. In Ahmadinejad's cabinet, 13 posts are held by former Guard or Basij commanders. By controlling government bids, contracts, and tariffs, particularly in the oil and gas sector, they've managed to siphon billions into private accounts. Some have suggested that the sharp anti-British response by the Iranian government was due to Britain's freezing over $1 billion in Iranian assets, much of which belonged to high ranking Guardsmen.

The re-election of Ahmadinejad is critical to both Khamenei's succession and the Revolutionary Guard's continued looting of the Iranian economy. Ahmadinejad would continue to serve as a front-man for the operation -- in return for fixing his re-election, he would support Mojtaba's succession, and allow the Guard to continue its crooked deals. If Mousavi were elected, both of these projects might be stopped.

So Khamenei is allied with the Guards (though some argue that Khamenei is being controlled by the Guards), and Ahmadinejad is their tool. They have the support of a minority of Parliament, and some hard-line clerics. Their opponents are, well, just about everybody else. This includes the moderates Karoubi, Mousavi, and Khatami. Probably the majority of high-ranking clerics oppose Khamenei, but most have been extremely cautious in taking a public stance. Rafsanjani, the richest man in Iran and head of the Assembly of Experts, stands to lose quite a bit if the Guards choke out his businesses. He has been cautious as well, making two ambiguous public statements. However his political party has come out on the side of the opposition. There is also a conservative faction in Parliament, exemplified by Speaker Ali Larijani, who are on the fence (I'm very skeptical of rumors that Larijani has endorsed Ahmadinejad).

The opposition doesn't want to overthrow the government. For the most part, they would like to take the country back to five years ago, when the vote was relatively fair and the entire system was overseen by the Supreme Leader. They believe this coup is taking the country away from its original Revolutionary principles.

The Guardian has a very interesting article out today quoting an anonymous "politician with strong connections to the security apparatus." The source says Mojtaba was the inspiration for the stolen election, and that he is running the Revolutionary Guard's response to the protests. He further claims there is a split between Mojtaba and the Guard's commanders, Ali Jafari and Ali Fazli. I'm very skeptical of this split, because of so much other evidence that the Guard is profiting from the current arrangement. Jafari spoke publicly yesterday, and made statements which appear quite hawkish, though it's hard to grasp the nuances through the translation.

New protests are scheduled for tomorrow, on the 18th Tir anniversary. Crowds will probably be beaten down again, but it will serve as a reminder that the Iranian people oppose this coup.